| TO: NAM | Appro red Ton R eleas E and address | DATE INITIAL | s | | |
|--------------------|---|-----------------------|---|---------------------|-----------------|
| 1 | 4/ | | | Security) (Security | Classification) |
| 3 | | | <u>5</u> | • | |
| | | | - | | |
| ACTION | DIRECT REPLY | PREPARE REPLY | | | |
| APPROVAL COMMENT | DISPATCH FILE | RECOMMENDATION RETURN | N . | | |
| CONCURRENCE MARKS: | INFORMATION | SIGNATURE | 4 | | |
| | | | | | 25X1 |
| | | | | | |
| | those app | roved for the | ment will be restricted following specific SENCE DAILY C. | activities: | |
| | those app | roved for the | | activities: ABLE | |

State Dept. review completed

Top Secret

25X1

Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP79T00975A030700010001


Late Item

| | PERU: Cabinet Reshuffle |
|------|--|
| 25X1 | Peruvian President Morales Bermudez' replacement of three cabinet ministers yesterday appears directly related to efforts to solve the country's deepening economic crisis. The shuffle was announced following a meeting between the President and Peru's highest ranking military officers, who approved the changes. |
| 25X1 | According to press reports, Finance Minister Saenz, Interior Minister Cisneros, and Industry, Commerce, and Tourism Minister Ibanez O'Brien were replaced. Saenz has been attacked as incompetent, while Cisneros and Ibanez O'Brien were persistent critics of the President's economic policies. A new head of the Central Bank will reportedly also be named. |
| 25X1 | Morales Bermudez appointed two highly qualified civil- ians to the Finance and the Industry, Commerce, and Tourism posts. The new Finance Minister is Javier Silva Ruete, former Central Bank adviser and currently coordinator of the Andean Development Fund. The second portfolio will be held by Gabriel Lanatta, former chief executive of Industrial Bank. |
| 25X1 | The shakeup gives Peru a new economic team and coincides with the return to Lima yesterday of Foreign Minister de la Puente, who has been in the US negotiating with the International Monetary Fund for desperately needed credits to offset Peru's burdensome debt payments. The changes, viewed in connection with new austerity measures announced Wednesday, are almost certain to be viewed as positive by both the IMF and the international banking community. |

| $\overline{}$ | _ | ` ' | 4 |
|---------------|---|-----|---|
| ٠, | - | Y | 7 |
| _ | J | ^ | |

Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T0097\$A030700010004-6

| senior | The NID Cable is for the purpose of in US officials. | nior |
|--------|--|--------------|
| | CONTENTS | |
| | • | |
| ussr: | Trial Dates for Dissidents | Page |
| USSR: | Trial Dates for Dissidents | Page |
| •• | Trial Dates for Dissidents CHINA: Border Clash | Page Page |
| USSR-C | | |



| ide attention in the US Government. | |
|---|-------|
| Soviet authorities ave been cautious in handling the Shcharanskiy case. In spite f considerable haggling between the government and his family hcharanskiy still does not have legal counsel. This situation ould change suddenly, but the authorities probably would give newly appointed counsel at least a month to prepare a defens Soviet intentions should become clearer by 15 June | : |
| hen the extended investigation phase of the Shcharanskiy case nds. The Soviet leaders probably will not allow the trial to roceed until they have decided how to handle the internationa mplications it will raise. They may be weighing the option of xpelling or exchanging Shcharanskiy following his conviction in the belief that such action would preserve the credibility f Soviet legal processes and yet avoid adverse international eaction. | 1 |
| | |
| | |
| | |

25X1

25X1

| * | |
|------|--|
| 25X1 | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | · |
| | USSR-CHINA: Border Clash |
| 25X1 | The Soviet news Agency TASS issued an admission yesterday that Soviet troops had inadvertently crossed the Chinese border on Tuesday but denied Chinese allegations that the incident was a "military provocation." TASS said the USSR had expressed regret to the Chinese; it is possible that Moscow has sent an official apology to Peking. |
| 25X1 | According to the TASS account, Soviet border "seamen" entered Chinese territory on Monday night while searching for a "dangerous armed criminal" and left without delay when they |

discovered they were on the Chinese side of the border. The Soviets asserted that the force had taken no action against

| Chinese citizens. The Chinese complained in their protest note on Thursday that Soviet troops had beaten and wounded several local inhabitants. |
|--|
| The Soviets seldom violate the Chinese border on the ground, and we have no information on the sequence of events that led to this intrusion. The rather lame Soviet explanation, however, suggests that Moscow recognizes that the Chinese have a strong case and wants the matter to pass with little controversy. |
| The Chinese probably will accept the Soviet expression or regret and not retaliate militarily. The Chinese probably will try to exploit the incidentparticularly with third partiesto demonstrate Soviet belligerence in the Sino-Soviet dispute. |
| Yesterday's second plenary session of the Sino-Soviet border talks took place as scheduled, an indication that neither side wants to jeopardize the few state-to-state dealings that exist. According to press accounts, however, the meeting was marked by a heated exchange over the border incident. |
| SPAIN: UDC Reorganization Spanish Prime Minister Suarez is belatedly taking steps to strengthen his disparate ruling party, the Union of the Democratic Center. The Prime Minister and his party have |

both slipped badly in public opinion polls, while the rival Socialists seem to be increasing in strength. With an election on the horizon, Suarez is making his move late in the game.

constitution and bedeviled by persistent economic problems, Suarez had let his party drift since the parliamentary election

| Preoccupied with the task of pushing through a new

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

last June. His inaction may also reflect a reluctance to delegate power and perhaps a failure--stemming from his apprenticeship in the Franco regime--to grasp the need for a well-structured party. Goaded by the prospect of an election later this year, by continuing squabbling in the party, and by the recent merger of the Socialist Party with the smaller Popular Socialist Party, Suarez on Thursday appointed a new general coordinator for the Democratic Center and carried out a minor shuffle of its executive committee. The key task of directing the party's organization went to an untested 36-year-old politician and lawyer, Rafael Arias Salgado. At first glance, Arias Salgado's relative inexperience does not augur well for his ability to put the Democratic Center's house in order. He has a powerful patron, however, in Second Deputy Prime Minister Abril, who is probably Suarez closest confidant. As a young social democrat, Arias Salgado is untainted by the ties to a Francoist past that could discredit many more senior candidates for the job. Moreover, his loyalty will be to Suarez, rather than to any of the powerful factions within the party. Suarez has left the secretary general slot unfilled; it has been vacant since the formation of the party a year ago. He may be holding the position in reserve should Arias Salgado prove unequal to his task, or Suarez may prefer to name a secretary general at the party congress, now expected to take place 25X1 some time next month.

BRIEFS

| prominent | According to press rep businessman and second ro Joaquin Chamorrow | cousin of slain as murdered earl | opposition y yesterday at |
|--|--|--|--|
| his home of fied. | utside Managua. The a | ssassins have no | t been identi- |
| part in reason part in reason promine that the Sing nevert | Although Pedro Jose Cent antigovernment dint an opposition leade omoza government had a heless could provide the leaders to break the anti-Somoza demonstrat | sturbances, he wer as his cousin. hand in his dea he catalyst soug uneasy calm and | as not nearly It is unlikel th. The kill- ht by radical |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| | | | |

| last month. This sale would be North Korea's first arms contract in Latin America and Guya <u>na's first significant arms</u> | |
|---|------|
| deal with a Communist supplier. | 25X1 |
| | |
| //Guyana has been anxious to purchase patrol | |
| craft for use on the Corentyne River on the disputed border | |
| with Surinam. North Korea builds several different types of | _ |
| fast attack craft that could serve Guyana's purposes. | 25X1 |

25X1 25X1

Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030700010004-6 **Top Secret**

(Security Classification)

Top Secret

Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP79T00975A030700010004-6

(Security Classification)